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LIMITING THE “UNLIMITED” SCOPE OF 18
U.S.C. § 3661: DEFINING THE REACH OF THE
SENTENCING COURTS’ DISCRETIONARY
POWERS
Jonevin Sabado
I. INTRODUCTION
In February of 2011, Collins Max Christensen pled guilty to one
count of wire fraud.1 The district court found that Christensen
misappropriated $985,994 of investor funds.2 As a result of
investments lost through Christensen, several investors were severely
and negatively impacted.3 During Christensen’s sentencing hearing,
the district court relied heavily on testimony provided by these
investors, which detailed the significant effect these losses had on
their lives.4 Although Christensen’s criminal conduct clearly
contributed to a portion of these losses, the majority of the damages
were a result of Christensen’s non-criminal activity.5 Nonetheless,
the district court determined that the recommended guideline
sentencing range of thirty-one to forty-one months was insufficient,
and consequently sentenced Christensen to sixty months in federal
prison—nineteen months above the high end of the applicable
advisory guideline range.6 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.7 While the
Ninth Circuit recognized that much of the damage reported by
Christensen’s victims resulted from his non-criminal conduct, it
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1. United States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013).
2. Id. at 1098.
3. Id. at 1099.
4. Id. at 1099–1100.
5. See id.
6. Id. at 1097.
7. Id.
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asserted that under 18 U.S.C. § 3661,8 a sentencing judge is virtually
unlimited in the “kind of information he may consider” when making
a sentencing determination.9
This Comment addresses the problematic implications of the
majority’s decision—specifically, the dangers of interpreting § 3661
too broadly. Part II of this Comment provides the factual background
of Christensen, while Part III discusses the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
in this case. Part IV considers salient issues raised by the dissent in
Christensen and utilizes those issues to examine the appropriate
scope of § 3661. Part V concludes that the Ninth Circuit erred in
affirming the district court’s decision to vary Christensen’s sentence
upward based on his non-criminal conduct.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 11, 2011, Christensen waived indictment and pled
guilty to one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.10
Christensen had solicited money from individual investors for six
land-development companies that he managed from 2006 through
2008.11 Through his efforts, Christensen received a total of
$2,385,959 from investors.12 Although some of these funds were
used for their purported use, Christensen diverted a significant
portion of the investments for undisclosed purposes.13 Christensen
admitted to misusing $985,994 of investors’ funds, $507,805 of
which was misappropriated for his own personal use.14
In preparation for Christensen’s sentencing hearing, the
probation officer submitted his Presentence Investigation Report
(PSR), which “summarized the losses sustained by the various
‘victims’ of Christensen’s [conduct].”15 These statements included
detailed illustrations of the negative impact Christensen’s conduct
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012). “No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning
the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” Id.
9. Christensen, 732 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747
(1994)).
10. Id. at 1097.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1097–98.
14. Id. at 1098.
15. Id. The court added that “[o]nly those persons who had some or all of their investment
funds unlawfully diverted by Christensen were listed as ‘victims’” Id.
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had on the investors’ lives, including a retirement-aged individual
claiming he could no longer retire and a woman claiming that
Christensen’s conduct led to the destruction of her marriage.16
In determining the appropriate sentence for Christensen, the
district court seriously considered the victims’ testimony.17 Noting
the “egregiousness of [Christensen’s] conduct” and the fact that he
“destroy[ed] [his] victims’ lives,” the district court determined the
sentencing guideline range did not sufficiently account for his
crime.18 Accordingly, the district court informed Christensen’s
counsel, one day before his sentencing was to begin, that “for ‘a
number of reasons’—it was considering an upward variance to [his]
sentence.”19
Upon giving Christensen a three-level credit for accepting
responsibility, the probation officer calculated Christensen’s total
offense level to be twenty.20 From this, the probation officer
provided that under the federal sentencing guidelines, Christensen’s
sentence should range from thirty-three to forty-one months.21
However, the district court maintained that the applicable advisory
guideline range was insufficient to account for Christensen’s
“egregious” and “life destroying” conduct and sentenced Christensen
to sixty months in federal prison.22
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
On appeal, Christensen raised several objections to his sentence,
only two of which were properly preserved for appeal. 23 Ultimately,
Christensen argued that the district court committed procedural error
by, among other things, “taking into account the ‘uncorroborated,’

16. Id. at 1099.
17. See id. The court also pointed out that Christensen had a prior felony conviction
(although twenty-eight years prior) for obtaining money by false pretenses. Id.
18. Id. at 1099–1100. The sentencing judge asserted, “I believe that given the egregiousness
of his conduct, including lying, covering up, using funds for personal purposes, destroying the
victims’ lives, cheating victims out of significant sums of money that they needed, and taking
advantage of personal relationships, that the guideline range doesn’t adequately account for the
harm that his conduct has caused.” Id.
19. Id. at 1098.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1099–1100.
23. Id. at 1100. Christensen asserted there was a “lack of notice regarding the basis for an
upward variance” and that the district court discounted his acceptance of responsibility. Id.
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‘unsworn,’ and ‘untested’ statements of victims.”24 The Ninth
Circuit, emphasizing that sentencing hearings are not limited by the
Federal Rules of Evidence, maintained that Christensen’s objection
was without merit.25 The Ninth Circuit fortified its position by citing
the Supreme Court’s decision in Nichols v. United States,26 where the
Court asserted that “a sentencing judge may appropriately conduct an
inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of
information he may consider, or the source from which it came.”27
Additionally, the Court’s statement seems consistent with § 3661.28
Further, the Ninth Circuit underscored Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32(d)(2)(B), which provides that “the [PSR] must contain
‘information that assesses any financial, social, psychological, and
medical impact on any victim.’”29 Accordingly, at sentencing, “a
district court may consider victim impact statements, whether sworn
or not.”30
In addition to evaluating the district court’s decision to consider
uncorroborated evidence in Christensen’s hearing, the Ninth Circuit
also addressed whether it was appropriate for the district court to
consider the “life-destroying impacts” described by Christensen’s
victims.31 Relying on § 3661 and Pepper v. United States,32 the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.33
Christensen’s victims reported damages that exceeded purely
financial losses. The PSR detailed several harrowing stories,
including a man of retirement-age that could no longer afford to
retire, and one woman’s failed marriage.34 However, the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that “[t]he victims reported the impacts they
suffered from having lost all of their investment dollars, without
24. Id. at 1102. Christensen also argued that the district court failed “to resolve factual
conflicts in the PSR regarding victim impact and loss amounts,” and failed “to provide advance
notice of the precise grounds for the upward variance in his sentence.” Id. at 1101.
25. Id. at 1102. Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(d)(3) provides that the Federal Rules of
Evidence are inapplicable to “sentencing.” FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3).
26. 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
27. Christensen, 732 F.3d at 1102 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nichols, 511
U.S. at 747).
28. See supra text accompanying note 8.
29. Christensen, 732 F.3d at 1102 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(B)).
30. Id. (citing United States v. Santana, 908 F.2d 506, 507 (9th Cir. 1990)).
31. See id. at 1104.
32. 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011).
33. Christensen, 732 F.3d at 1106.
34. Id. at 1104.
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differentiating losses that were solely attributable to Christensen’s
diversion of funds.”35 The Ninth Circuit then went on to say that
“[t]hese ‘life-destroying impacts’ undoubtedly went beyond the
stipulated losses to investors based on [his] diversion of funds.”36
Despite this, the Ninth Circuit asserted that because of the broad
discretionary powers given to sentencing judges by § 3661, even
those “life-destroying impacts” that could not directly be tied to
Christensen’s criminal conduct were appropriate for the district court
to consider.37
In furtherance of this position, the Ninth Circuit likewise pointed
to Pepper v. United States, where the Supreme Court encouraged
sentencing courts to “consider the widest possible breath of
information about a defendant.”38 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
discerned that the life-destroying impacts gave “greater insight into
Christensen’s ‘background, character, and conduct’” which the
district court was wholly within its discretionary powers to
consider.39
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit maintained that the “dollar amount” of
the victims’ losses was not the central basis for the district court’s
decision to impose an upward variance.40 Rather, it was the
“intangible nature of [his] conduct.”41 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
asserted that to reduce these life-destroying impacts to “simple
arithmetic” and ignore the “indivisible nature of the harm” is to
misunderstand the point entirely.42 Moreover, the court noted, “This
is precisely the type of situation in which the Guidelines do not
adequately account for the seriousness of the offense.”43 As such, it

35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. Id. The Court asserted that this would “ensure that the punishment [would] suit not
merely the offense but the individual defendant.” Id. (citing Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
1229 (2011)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1105.
41. Id.
42. Id. As an example, the court discusses the case of Jennifer R., the woman who lost her
marriage. The court, defending its position against the dissent, explains that the important aspect
of Jennifer R.’s story was not the amount of money lost but rather the fact that she and her
husband entrusted Christensen with their life savings, and he defrauded them. Id.
43. Id.
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was appropriate for the district court to consider the entirety of these
life-destroying impacts.44
IV. ANALYSIS: DELINEATING THE SCOPE OF § 3661
As detailed above, in upholding Christensen’s sentence, the
Ninth Circuit relied principally on § 3661 and case law that
illustrates the broad discretionary powers afforded to sentencing
courts.45 Accordingly, the key consideration in evaluating the Ninth
Circuit’s decision is the appropriate scope of § 3661.
There is no question that § 3661 grants broad discretionary
powers to sentencing courts—its language is direct and
unambiguous.46 The statute provides, “No limitation shall be placed
on the information concerning the background, character, and
conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing
an appropriate sentence.”47 The phrase “no limitation” seems to
confer an indisputable discretion to sentencing judges in this respect.
Therefore, it would follow that a sentencing court is wholly within its
discretionary powers to consider any information about the
background, character, and conduct of a person when determining an
appropriate sentence—including non-criminal conduct.
However, is this discretionary power really without limit? Take,
for example, a man convicted of an armed robbery. May the court
consider the fact that he is left-handed for sentencing purposes? Such
consideration would seem bizarre and irrational, yet this type of
deliberation is logically consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s broad
interpretation of § 3661.
To evaluate the reach of § 3661, it is useful to consider the
general discretionary power given to sentencing courts and,
moreover, where this power comes from.

44. Id.
45. See generally Christensen, 732 F.3d at 1104–05 (quoting § 3661 multiple times and
citing to supporting case law [e.g., Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011)]).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012); see also Mark T. Doerr, Not Guilty? Go to Jail. The
Unconstitutionality of Acquitted-Conduct Sentencing, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 260
(2009) (explaining the “argument for broad discretion for the judge in sentencing is based on the
public policy that sentences must be specifically tailored to the individual defendant”).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (emphasis added).
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A. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
and United States v. Booker48
Beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the early 1980s, the
federal government commenced efforts to reform the federal
sentencing system.49 Historically, convicted offenders were
sentenced pursuant to “one of two penal policies—indeterminate and
determinate sentences.”50 In the years leading up to the Sentencing
Reform Act, indeterminate sentences predominated.51 However,
there was a “perceived failure of the indeterminate system to ‘cure’
the criminal.”52 This “perceived failure” of the sentencing system,
coupled with a growing national crime rate, prompted the
government to create the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.53 In so
doing, Congress hoped to “bring uniformity and determinacy to
sentences in the United States courts.”54 As a result of the Federal
Sentencing Reform Act, Congress initiated mandatory sentencing
guidelines that judges were required to follow except under limited
and “specified circumstances [that] the judge [had to] explicitly
identify.”55
In 2005, the federal sentencing guidelines were significantly
weakened after the Supreme Court, in a two-part opinion, struck
down the provision in the guidelines that made them mandatory.56 In
United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory
nature of the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to a trial

48. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
49. LISA M. SEGHETTI & ALISON M. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32766, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: BACKGROUND, LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS i (2007).
50. Id. at 10.
51. See id. at 11.
52. Id. at 12.
53. See id.
54. Doerr, supra note 46, at 238.
55. Id. at 239. Citing sections of the Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines Manual, Doerr
explains,
The Guidelines operate by assigning to each criminal offense an initial “offense level”
called the “Base Offense Level.” From there, the sentencing court is directed to “apply
the adjustments as appropriate related to victim, role, and obstruction of justice” and
“apply the adjustment as appropriate for the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.”
Both adjustments function to either increase or decrease the offense level. Once the
appropriate offense level is determined, a sentencing judge determines the defendant’s
criminal history category. The defendant’s sentencing range is then calculated.
Id.
56. See SEGHETTI & SMITH, supra note 49, at 1.
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by jury.57 Accordingly, “federal judges are no longer bound by
mandatory sentencing guidelines but need only consult them when
they punish federal criminals.”58
However, Booker also provides that while sentencing judges
have broad freedom to decide for themselves what sentences are
appropriate for criminals, their decisions are “subject to reversal if
appeals courts find them unreasonable.”59
Although the Booker Court held that the sentencing guidelines
would no longer be mandatory, the Court specified that the
guidelines must still be considered during sentencing hearings.60
Accordingly, sentencing judges must be familiar with key provisions
of the sentencing guidelines, including what conduct they may
consider when making a sentencing determination.
B. The Scope of “Relevant Conduct”
The scope of what conduct a sentencing judge may consider is
often referred to as relevant conduct,61 specified in U.S. Sentencing
Guideline (U.S.S.G.) § 1B1.3.62 Section 1B1.3 provides that relevant
conduct includes, “all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by
defendant,” “all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions
specified [in the aforementioned section],” and “any other
information specified in the applicable guideline.”63
Although § 1B1.3 does not articulate whether the scope of
“relevant conduct” is limited to criminal conduct, several federal
appellate courts have unanimously held that the provision considers
only those acts of the defendant that are unlawful.64 For example, in
57. Id. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part, “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
58. Charles Lane, Sentencing Standards No Longer Mandatory, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3336-2005Jan12.html.
59. Id.
60. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (Tashima, J.,
dissenting).
62. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2013) [hereinafter § 1B1.3].
63. See. id. at 22–23.
64. Christensen, 732 F.3d at 1110 (Tashima, J., dissenting). Judge Tashima cited to United
States v. Catchings, 708 F.3d 710, 712, 720 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Griffith, 584 F.3d
1004, 1013 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Schaefer, 291 F.3d 932, 940–41 (7th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Dove, 247 F.3d 152, 155 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 443
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United States v. Catchings,65 the Sixth Circuit in no uncertain terms
asserted, “Relevant conduct under [§ 1B1.3] must be criminal
conduct. If not, such conduct is not relevant for the purpose of
calculating a defendant’s Guidelines range.”66 There, the Court of
Appeals found the district court incorrectly included non-criminal
conduct as relevant conduct for the purposes of determining an
appropriate sentence for the defendant.67 Accordingly, the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court’s sentence and remanded for resentencing.68 The Court of Appeals reasoned that,
In calculating the Guidelines loss under U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(b)(1), district courts include losses sustained from
relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Although
“relevant conduct is not limited to conduct for which the
defendant has been convicted,” the conduct must “amount
to an offense for which a criminal defendant could
potentially be incarcerated.”69
Consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Catchings, the
Tenth Circuit likewise determined that relevant conduct is limited to
conduct that is “criminal” or “unlawful”.70 Acknowledging that six
other circuits have concluded that § 1B1.3 exclusively considers
conduct that is criminal, the Tenth Circuit “[made] explicit what
[had] been implicit in [its] own precedent.”71 Accordingly, it further
stated,
For a district court to consider a defendant’s conduct as
“relevant” under the Sentencing Guidelines, the
Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant (1) engaged in conduct (2) related to the
offense of conviction pursuant to [§ 1B1.3] and (3)
constituting a criminal offense under either a federal or a
state statute. 72

(8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Peterson, 101 F.3d 375, 385 (5th Cir. 1996); and United States v.
Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 830–31 (3d Cir. 1995).
65. 708 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2013).
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 719–20.
68. Id. at 722.
69. Id. at 720 (citing United States v. Maken, 510 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 2007)).
70. United States v. Griffith, 584 F.3d 1004, 1013 (10th Cir. 2009).
71. Id.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, although federal judges have broad discretionary
sentencing powers, these powers are not without limits.
C. Relevant Conduct and Christensen
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, Judge
Tashima, the lone dissenting judge in Christensen, maintained that
although the sentencing courts are afforded a substantial degree of
deference, it “does not mean anything goes.”73 Moreover, Judge
Tashima emphasized that “the abuse of discretion standard of review
is not a rubber stamp of all sentencing decisions made by a district
court, and [the appellate court] should not turn a blind eye when a
district court distorts the sentencing process.”74
According to Judge Tashima, this is precisely what the majority
was guilty of doing.75 In making this assertion, Judge Tashima
focused primarily on the majority’s over-inclusive interpretation of
§ 3661.76
From its own explanation, the district court based its decision to
impose a harsher sentence on Christensen because of the individual
impacts that his conduct had on his victims.77 However, as the
majority even acknowledged, the losses reported in the PSR
contained all monetary losses suffered by the victims—including
investments lost as a result of Christensen’s non-criminal conduct.78
Furthermore, the losses were undifferentiated between those funds
lost as a result of Christensen’s misappropriation and those lost
through valid business investments.79 Consequently, it follows that
the district court at least partially based its decision to impose an
upward variance on Christensen’s sentence based on non-criminal
conduct.

73. United States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013) (Tashima, J.,
dissenting).
74. Id. at 1107 (citing United States v. Ruff, 535 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (Gould, J.,
dissenting)).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 1111. In fact, Judge Tashima offered two explanations for the district court’s
erroneous sentencing determination: (1) Either the district court “mistakenly believed that [all]
losses in question [resulted] from Christensen’s conduct,” or (2) “it knowingly increased the
sentence based on the impact of non-criminal conduct.” Id. at 1107. This Comment will only
explore the second explanation.
77. See id. at 1099–1100 (majority opinion).
78. Id. at 1104.
79. Id.
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Again, Christensen received a total of $2,385,959 from
investors, but he misappropriated only $985,994 of that total.80 As
such, more than half of the total investments Christensen received
were actually used for the intended use.
As mentioned above, during Christensen’s sentencing hearing,
the district court focused on two of his victims in particular: Robert
G. and Jennifer R.81 Robert G. was a victim of retirement age.82
Because of the money he lost investing with Christensen, Robert G.
maintained that he no longer was able to retire as planned.83
However, the PSR revealed that Robert G. lost only $5,496 due to
Christensen’s criminal conduct.84 Furthermore, Christensen repaid
Robert G. “all but $192 of that loss more than two years prior to the
sentencing hearing.”85
Likewise, Jennifer R., the victim most reviewed by the majority,
reported that she had lost a total of $330,000 investing with
Christensen.86 Jennifer R. asserted that the losses she suffered
through her investments with Christensen led to the destruction of
her marriage.87 Like in the case of Robert G., the PSR revealed that
while Jennifer R. may have lost a total of $330,000 through her
dealings with Christensen, only $23,017 of that amount was
attributable to his fraudulent conduct.88
Viewed together, the cases of Robert G. and Jennifer R.
demonstrate that the district court’s reliance on losses based on noncriminal conduct were of no small consequence.89 Therefore, the key
question becomes: to what extent, if any, may a district court
consider the impact of non-criminal conduct in making a
determination to vary a sentence upwards?
Admittedly, the determination by the Sixth, Tenth, Seventh,
Fourth, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits—that § 1B1.3 relevant conduct is
limited to criminal conduct—is not controlling precedent for
Christensen. However, by choosing to include non-criminal conduct
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 1097–98.
See id. at 1099–1100.
Id. at 1108 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1109.
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within the scope of § 1B1.3, the Ninth Circuit would be rejecting an
established model endorsed throughout the country.90
Moreover, those six circuits have articulated compelling
arguments to support their contention that § 1B1.3 is strictly limited
to criminal conduct. For example, in United States v. Peterson,91 the
Fifth Circuit explained,
[f]or conduct to be considered “relevant conduct” for the
purpose of establishing ones [sic] offense level that conduct
must be criminal . . . To hold otherwise would allow
individuals to be punished by having their guideline range
increased for activity which is not prohibited by law but
merely morally distasteful or viewed as simply wrong by the
sentencing court.92
Additionally, including non-criminal conduct within the scope
of § 1B1.3 poses some practical issues for the court. In United States
v. Dove,93 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the position that § 1B1.3
relevant conduct only concerns criminal conduct for sentencing
purposes.94 There, the government, in an attempt to expand the scope
of § 1B1.3 beyond criminal conduct, argued that all “non-benign
conduct [could] properly be considered as relevant conduct.”95
Despite the government’s efforts to introduce a more inclusive
definition of relevant conduct, the Fourth Circuit prudently rejected
its approach. The court reasoned that “if conduct which is not illegal
may be relevant conduct because it is ‘not benign,’ this approach
would involve sentencing courts in the impossibly subjective task of
determining the relative ‘benignness’ of various legally permissible
acts . . . .”96 The Fourth Circuit raises an important concern.
Specifically, on what criteria would sentencing courts base their
determination of what is, and what is not, “benign”? Furthermore,
with such blatant ambiguity inherent in the process of determining
“benignness,” sentencing courts would undoubtedly face difficulties
achieving any consistency from case to case. In this respect,
including non-criminal conduct within the scope of § 1B1.3
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
United States v. Peterson, 101 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 385 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
247 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 155.
Id.
Id.
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frustrates the two main objectives the sentencing guidelines were
designed to accomplish: consistency and uniformity.
Lastly, in the wake of Booker, perhaps the most controversial
issue concerning sentencing practices may be the use of
past-acquitted conduct.97 Although the Supreme Court in United
States v. Watts98 held that evidence of acquitted conduct may be
considered at sentencing,99 there has been a growing concern for the
rule’s constitutionality.100 Still, even here, the conduct being
considered is at least potentially unlawful or criminal.
V. CONCLUSION
As noted above, when the federal sentencing guidelines were
still mandatory, sentencing judges were only permitted to vary
upward from the guidelines under very limited circumstances.101
However, since the Booker ruling, upward variances are “imposed at
a rate double that of the rate before Booker.”102 The frequency of
upward variances post-Booker is troubling, and may “suggest that
judges have struggled with the implications of the advisory nature of
the post-Booker Guidelines and are perhaps overusing the mandate
that ‘no limitations’ shall be placed on the evidence considered at
sentencing.”103 Given this trend, it is increasingly important to ensure
sentencing courts understand the limitations inherent in their § 3661
discretionary powers. While § 3661 provides sentencing courts with
broad discretionary power, this Comment has established that this
discretion is not without its limits—irrespective of the statute’s rigid
language.
97. See Doerr, supra note 46, at 235.
98. 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
99. Id. at 156.
100. Megan Sterback, Getting Time for an Acquitted Crime: The Unconstitutional Use of
Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing and New York’s Call for Change, 26 TOURO L. REV. 1223, 1224
(2011).
Although the federal circuits generally adhere to the federal rule as proscribed by
Watts, there is a growing chorus—from the bench and bar—calling into question the
constitutionality and fundamental fairness of [the rule allowing acquitted conduct to be
considered at sentencing], which has been called a repugnant and a uniquely
malevolent aspect of the current federal sentencing regime.
Id. at 1224–25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. See Doerr, supra note 46, at 239.
102. Id. at 236 (citing Erin P. Johnson, Advisory Guidelines and Lengthier Sentences:
Relevant Conduct Sentencing as an Increasingly Harmful Sentencing Practice Post-Booker, 1
HUM. RTS. & GLOBALIZATION L. REV. 147, 148–49 (2008)).
103. Id.
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Here, the Ninth Circuit has stretched the breadth of § 3661 far
beyond its permissible reach. By varying Christensen’s sentence
upward—due, in large part, to losses resulting from his non-criminal
conduct—the court erroneously affirmed the district court’s
sentencing determination.
While the Ninth Circuit has not formally ruled on the question
of whether non-criminal conduct can be considered relevant conduct
for sentencing purposes, it should take note from its sister circuits.
As Judge Tashima poignantly suggests, if the Ninth Circuit is able to
employ § 3661 to depart upward in cases like Christensen, its logic
may lead it down a slippery slope of absurdity. Judge Tashima stated
“[if this were permissible,] then a sentencing court could vary
upward based on a defendant’s eating or dressing habits, the tradition
or school of yoga he favors, or the regularity with which he recycles,
all of which provide greater insight into the defendant’s background,
character, and conduct.”104 Judge Tashima’s message is clear:
“relevant conduct” is criminal conduct—and six other circuits agree.

104. United States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1111 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

